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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
OAKLAND DIVISION

No. 4:19-cv-07481-JST

IN RE PLANTRONICS, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION

**LEAD COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES; AND
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
THEREOF**

Judge: Hon. Jon S. Tigar
Courtroom: 6
Date: August 14, 2025
Time: 2:00 p.m.

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 Court-appointed Lead Counsel for the Settlement Class and counsel for Lead Plaintiffs Ilya
3 Trubnikov and Roofers’ Pension Fund (“Lead Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this memorandum
4 of law in support of their application for (a) an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 22% of
5 the Settlement Fund (including interest earned on the Settlement Fund); and (b) payment of
6 \$593,198.12 in litigation expenses that were reasonably incurred by Lead Counsel in prosecuting
7 and resolving the Action.¹

8 **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

9 Lead Counsel have vigorously litigated this securities class action over the last five years
10 on a fully contingent basis, without receiving any compensation. The litigation was hard fought,
11 and Lead Counsel faced risks from the outset that they would be unable to obtain a meaningful
12 recovery for Lead Plaintiffs and the class. As such, Lead Counsel had to—and did—dedicate very
13 substantial efforts to the Action from its outset. Lead Counsel conducted an extensive
14 investigation, prepared a detailed consolidated complaint based on that investigation, opposed two
15 rounds of motions to dismiss, prepared Lead Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, and
16 conducted substantial fact discovery, which included obtaining and reviewing hundreds of
17 thousands of pages of documents and conducting eight depositions.

18 Through Lead Counsel’s sustained litigation efforts, they achieved the proposed \$29.5
19 million Settlement for the benefit of Lead Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class. The \$29.5 million
20 recovery represents a very favorable result for the Settlement Class and provides meaningful and
21 certain compensation to Settlement Class Members while avoiding the significant risks and delay
22 of continued litigation, including the risk that there might be no recovery at all. Having achieved
23 this significant monetary recovery after litigating this case without any payment for five years,
24

25 ¹ Unless otherwise defined in this memorandum, all capitalized terms have the meanings defined
26 in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, dated July 18, 2024 (ECF No. 230-1) (the
27 “Stipulation”), or the Joint Fee Declaration. Citations to “¶ ___” in this memorandum refer to
28 paragraphs in the Joint Fee Declaration and citations to “Ex. ___” refer to exhibits to the Joint Fee
Declaration. Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis is added and internal citations are omitted.

1 Lead Counsel now apply for attorneys' fees in the amount of 22% of the Settlement Fund, as well
2 as payment for the litigation expenses that Lead Counsel incurred in prosecuting the Action.

3 The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that, in class actions resulting in a common fund
4 like this one, a percentage award is appropriate, and an award of 25% of the settlement amount is
5 the "benchmark." *In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th Cir. 2015).
6 The requested 22% fee is below this "benchmark" and is well within the range of fees awarded in
7 comparable class action cases. The requested fee percentage is also strongly supported by factors
8 often considered by courts in determining the reasonableness of the fee (and that could support an
9 upward adjustment to the benchmark), including the significant risks presented by this contingent
10 fee litigation, the quality of the result achieved, the extent and quality of Lead Counsel's efforts,
11 and the lodestar cross-check.

12 Lead Counsel prosecuted the Action on a contingency-fee basis and bore the risk that
13 counsel would receive no compensation. As discussed herein, there were multiple risks inherent
14 in the Action. The riskiness of the Action is highlighted by, among other things, the facts that the
15 Company never restated any of its financial statements and there was no parallel SEC or DOJ
16 enforcement action ever brought related to the alleged fraud.

17 As discussed below, Defendants strenuously argued that there was no channel-stuffing
18 scheme and that their statements at issue were not false when made, were not material to investors,
19 and not made with the required scienter. There were risks from the outset that a factfinder might
20 support Defendants' view on one of these issues—in which case there would be no recovery at all.
21 Lead Counsel also faced notable risks in proving loss causation and damages in the Action. In
22 particular, there were serious challenges in proving that disclosure of Defendants' alleged channel
23 stuffing—and not other non-fraud information concerning Plantronics' business—caused the price
24 declines at issue. And, even if Lead Plaintiffs could establish a causal connection, quantifying the
25 amount of damages resulting from the alleged fraud (as opposed to other non-fraud-related news)
26 would pose additional challenges. Thus, Lead Plaintiffs would have faced substantial tests at
27 summary judgment, trial, and on appeal in prevailing on its claims, including damages. Lead

1 Counsel were able to overcome these hurdles and secure a meaningful recovery for the Settlement
2 Class.

3 The requested attorneys' fees are also supported by the substantial efforts that Lead
4 Counsel dedicated to the Action to achieve the Settlement over the last five years. Among other
5 things, Lead Counsel (1) conducted an extensive investigation into the claims asserted, which
6 included a detailed review of public documents, interviews with over 50 former Plantronics
7 employees, and consultation with an expert financial economist; (2) drafted a detailed amended
8 complaint sufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities
9 Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA"); (3) researched and briefed Lead Plaintiffs' opposition to
10 Defendants' two rounds of motions to dismiss; (4) researched and briefed Lead Plaintiffs' motion
11 for class certification; (5) conducted extensive discovery, including propounding detailed
12 document requests to Defendants and subpoenas to third parties, obtaining and reviewing
13 substantial document productions, taking depositions, and working with experts; and (6) engaged
14 in extensive arm's-length settlement negotiations to achieve the Settlement, including preparation
15 of mediation briefing and two formal mediation sessions.

16 Lead Counsel dedicated a total of over 20,500 hours of attorney and other professional staff
17 time over the course of litigation to bring the Action to this resolution. ¶¶ 79-80. In class actions
18 like this one, which are prosecuted on a contingent-fee basis, courts commonly award fees
19 representing a positive "multiplier" of counsel's lodestar of up to four times the amount of their
20 lodestar to compensate counsel for taking the risks of non-recovery and other factors. Here, in
21 contrast, the requested fee represents a "negative" multiplier of 0.55 of Lead Counsel's lodestar
22 (¶ 79), which is below the range of multipliers typically awarded in comparable cases and strongly
23 supports the reasonableness of the fee requested. In other words, despite the substantial
24 contingency risk Lead Counsel faced and the fact that courts often apply positive multipliers in
25 similar circumstances, the requested fee here represents a substantial discount of roughly 45% on
26 Lead Counsel's lodestar. Moreover, Lead Counsel's fee request is consistent with the more
27 restrictive of two separate retainer agreements entered into between Lead Counsel and Lead

1 Plaintiffs at the outset of the litigation, and following their diligent supervision of the Action, Lead
2 Plaintiffs endorse Lead Counsel’s fee request.

3 Finally, Lead Counsel seek to recover the litigation expenses that they incurred in
4 prosecuting and resolving this litigation, which totaled \$593,198.12. As discussed below, these
5 expenses were reasonable and necessary for the prosecution and resolution of the litigation and are
6 of the type that are routinely charged to clients in non-contingent litigation.

7 For the reasons set forth herein, Lead Counsel respectfully request that the Court award
8 attorneys’ fees in the amount of 22% of the Settlement Fund and payment of litigation expenses
9 in the amount of \$593,198.12.

10 ARGUMENT

11 **I. Lead Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees of 22% of the Settlement Fund 12 is below the “benchmark percentage” in this Circuit.**

13 The Ninth Circuit has established that, in common-fund cases such as this one, the
14 “benchmark” percentage attorney fee award is 25% of the settlement fund. *See, e.g., Online DVD-*
15 *Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d at 949; *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935,
16 942 (9th Cir. 2011); *Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S.*, 307 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th
17 Cir. 2002); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998); *Six (6) Mexican*
18 *Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers*, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts in this District
19 have found fee awards in the amount of the 25% benchmark to be “presumptively reasonable.” *In*
20 *re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.*, 2018 WL 3960068, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018) (“[I]t is
21 well established that 25% of a common fund is a presumptively reasonable amount of attorneys’
22 fees.”); *Booth v. Strategic Realty Trust, Inc.*, 2015 WL 6002919, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2015)
23 (same). Indeed, courts have found that, “in most common fund cases, the award *exceeds* that
24 benchmark” of 25%. *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
25 *see also In re Allergan, Inc. Proxy Violation Derivatives Litig.*, 2018 WL 4959014, at *1 (C.D.
26 Cal. Aug. 13, 2018) (“The Ninth Circuit uses a 25% benchmark in common fund class actions,
27 and ‘in most common fund cases, the award exceeds that benchmark,’ with a 30% award the norm
28 ‘absent extraordinary circumstances that suggest reasons to lower or increase the percentage.’”);

1 *Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc.*, 2013 WL 3790896, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2013) (“The Ninth Circuit
2 uses a 25% baseline in common fund class actions, and ‘in most common fund cases, the award
3 exceeds that benchmark,’ with a 30% award the norm ‘absent extraordinary circumstances that
4 suggest reasons to lower or increase the percentage.’”).

5 The 22% fee request here is thus below with the 25% Ninth Circuit benchmark and more
6 than presumptively reasonable. Further, the 22% fee request is also well within the range of
7 percentage fees typically awarded in securities class actions and other complex class actions in the
8 Ninth Circuit with recoveries comparable to the \$29.5 million settlement achieved here. *See, e.g.*,
9 *In re QuantumScape Sec. Class Action*, 2025 WL 353556, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2025)
10 (awarding 30% of \$47.5 million settlement); *In re Splunk Inc. Sec. Litig.*, Case No. 4:20-cv-08600-
11 JST, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2024), ECF No. 143 (Ex. 7A) (awarding 25% of \$30 million
12 settlement); *In re Lyft Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2023 WL 5068504, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2023)
13 (awarding 25% of \$25 million settlement); *Fleming v. Impax Lab’s Inc.*, 2022 WL 2789496, at
14 *9 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2022) (awarding 30% of \$33 million settlement); *In re Tezos Sec. Litig.*,
15 2020 WL 13699946, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2020) (awarding 33.3% of \$25 million settlement);
16 *In re Silver Wheaton Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 2020 WL 4581642, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2020)
17 (awarding 30% of \$41.5 million settlement); *In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg, Sales*
18 *Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 2019 WL 2077847, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) (awarding
19 25% of \$48 million settlement). And a statistical review of all PSLRA settlements from 2015 to
20 2024 reveals that the median fee award in settlements ranging from \$25 million to \$100 million
21 was 25%. *See* Edward Flores & Svetlana Starykh, *Recent Trends in Securities Class Action*
22 *Litigation: 2024 Full-Year Review*, NERA (2025), at 30 (Ex. 7B).

23 **II. Additional factors considered by courts support approval of the requested fee.**

24 The reasonableness of Lead Counsel’s 22% fee request is further confirmed by additional
25 factors considered by courts in this Circuit, including (1) the results achieved, (2) the risks of
26 litigation, (3) the skill required and the quality of work, (4) the contingent nature of the fee and the
27 financial burden carried by the plaintiffs, (5) awards made in similar cases, (6) the class’s reaction,

1 and (7) a lodestar cross-check. *See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50 (9th Cir.
2 2002); *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-48.

3 **A. The quality of the result achieved supports the fee request.**

4 Courts consider the results achieved in assessing a fee award request. *See Vizcaino*, 290
5 F.3d at 1048 (“results are a relevant” factor in awarding attorneys’ fees). Lead Counsel
6 respectfully submit that the \$29.5 million cash settlement is a very favorable result for the
7 Settlement Class in this case, especially when considering the risk of a significantly lower
8 recovery—or no recovery at all—if the case proceeded through summary judgment, trial, and the
9 inevitable appeals.

10 The \$29.5 million Settlement is approximately three times as large as the median securities
11 class action settlement in the Ninth Circuit. ¶ 58. The Settlement is also very favorable when
12 considered against the risks of litigation and the range of potential damages that could be proved
13 at trial. Lead Plaintiffs and their damages expert estimate that the maximum theoretical damages
14 that could be established at trial would be approximately \$248 million. Accordingly, the
15 Settlement achieved here represents a favorable recovery of approximately 12% of the Settlement
16 Class’s maximum damages. ¶ 63. Moreover, that maximum recovery amount assumes that Lead
17 Plaintiffs would prevail entirely on all liability issues for the entire Class Period and all loss
18 causation and damages issues, and could establish that the full amount of the abnormal declines in
19 Plantronics stock on the three alleged corrective disclosure dates (as well as a follow-on reaction
20 on June 19, 2019), was causally connected to Defendants’ alleged misstatements. ¶ 60. As
21 discussed further below, Plaintiffs’ success on all of these elements was far from certain.

22 Courts in this Circuit have approved settlements with comparable or lower percentage
23 recoveries than obtained here as fair and reasonable. *See, e.g., In re Aqua Metals, Inc. Sec. Litig.*,
24 2022 WL 612804, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022) (“Class Counsel contends that this settlement
25 offer constitutes 7.3% of the most likely recoverable damages, assuming Plaintiffs were to prevail
26 on all claims against the Defendants The Court agrees that this recovery is in line with
27 comparable class action settlements.”); *Vataj v. Johnson*, 2021 WL 5161927, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov.

1 5, 2021) (approving settlement recovering “slightly more than 2% of [] estimated damages” and
2 noting that it was “consistent with the 2-3% average recovery that the parties identified in other
3 securities class action settlements”); *In re Extreme Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2019 WL 3290770,
4 at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2019) (approving settlement representing between 5% and 9.5% of
5 maximum potential damages); *Azar v. Blount Int’l, Inc.*, 2019 WL 7372658, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 31,
6 2019) (approving settlement recovering 4.63% to 7.65% of the class’s total estimated damages);
7 *In re Biolase, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2015 WL 12720318, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2015) (finding
8 settlement recovering 8% of estimated damages “equals or surpasses the recovery in many other
9 securities class actions”); *IBEW Local 697 v. Int’l Game Tech.*, 2012 WL 5199742, at *3 (D. Nev.
10 Oct. 19, 2012) (approving settlement representing “about 3.5% of the maximum damages that
11 Plaintiffs believe[d] could be recovered” and finding it “within the median recovery in securities
12 class actions settled in the last few years”).

13 Moreover, the recovery is particularly strong in light of Defendants’ potential arguments
14 that might have substantially reduced the class’s damages. For example, Defendants were
15 expected to argue that the price declines on June 18 and 19, 2019, following the initial alleged
16 corrective disclosure, resulted from Plantronics’ disclosure of tariffs impacting its sales in China—
17 rather than from release of information about the alleged channel stuffing scheme. ¶ 64.
18 Defendants were also expected to challenge loss causation for the other two remaining alleged
19 corrective disclosures on the grounds that the information disclosed was not sufficiently related to
20 the alleged misstatements. *Id.* In addition, if Defendants succeeded in arguing that certain of the
21 misstatements were not actionable, the Class Period could have been shortened and the maximum
22 damages for the shortened Class Period would be greatly reduced, potentially to \$112.9 million if
23 the first actionable misstatement was found to occur on May 8, 2019. *Id.* Accordingly, if Lead
24 Plaintiffs were unable to sustain the entire Class Period or were unable to establish loss causation
25 for certain of the alleged disclosures, or for some portion of the price declines on those days, the
26 potential damages that could be recovered at trial would be substantially reduced from the \$248
27 million maximum. *Id.*

1 Given the significant risks of establishing liability and loss causation here, Lead Counsel
2 believe that this level of recovery represents an excellent result for the Settlement Class and that
3 the result achieved supports the fee requested.

4 **B. The substantial risks of the litigation support the fee request.**

5 “The risks assumed by Class Counsel, particularly the risk of non-payment or
6 reimbursement of expenses, is a factor in determining counsel’s proper fee award.” *In re Heritage*
7 *Bond Litig.*, 2005 WL 1594389, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005); *see also, e.g., In re Washington*
8 *Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.* (“WPPSS”), 19 F.3d 1291, 1299-1301 (9th Cir. 1994);
9 *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.

10 Lead Counsel faced significant risks in this Action. This action was subject to the pleading
11 requirements of the PSLRA. *See Johnson v. US Auto Parts Network, Inc.*, 2008 WL 11343481, at
12 *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2008) (noting that “securities actions have become more difficult from a
13 plaintiff’s perspective in the wake of the PSLRA”). To satisfy the PSLRA’s requirements, Lead
14 Counsel were required to—and did—conduct a substantial investigation, which included (among
15 other things) interviewing over 50 former Plantronics or Polycom employees, with nine of their
16 accounts featured in the complaint. To satisfy the PSLRA’s requirements, Lead Counsel also
17 needed to consult extensively with Lead Plaintiffs’ expert on issues of loss causation and damages,
18 as well as conduct a thorough review of Plantronics’ public statements and stock price
19 movements—all before filing the amended complaint.

20 Despite this significant effort, some of the many risks in the Action were realized at the
21 motion to dismiss stage when the Court dismissed certain categories of Lead Plaintiffs’ claims in
22 its August 17, 2022 Order, although Lead Plaintiffs were later able to restore their claims
23 concerning statements made on August 7, 2018, based on further evidence developed in discovery.
24 ¶¶ 42-43.

25 Moreover, as discussed in greater detail in the Joint Fee Declaration, many substantial
26 challenges remained. This was not a case in which Plantronics ever restated its financials, nor was
27 there any parallel SEC or other government action brought against Plantronics or any of the

1 Defendants for the alleged fraud. Lead Plaintiffs would have none of those tailwinds in attempting
2 to prove that Defendants’ statements were materially false; that Defendants knew that their
3 statements were false when made or were deliberately reckless in making the statements; and that
4 the disclosures concerning Defendants’ false and misleading statements caused declines in the
5 price of Plantronics’ common stock.

6 Defendants had substantial arguments concerning each of these issues. To start, Lead
7 Plaintiffs faced challenges in proving that Defendants made misleading statements or omissions
8 by failing to disclose the Company’s revenues were the result of an alleged channel-stuffing
9 scheme that temporarily boosted the Company’s short-term revenues at the expense of long-term
10 revenue. Defendants argued that the Company’s channel sales and inventory data from the Class
11 Period was inconsistent with Lead Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Company had engaged in a
12 channel-stuffing scheme—because the sales data did not show any appreciable spike in channel
13 inventory as to the total units of Company products in the overall channel. Second, Defendants
14 would have argued that any increases in channel inventory were unrelated to any purported
15 channel stuffing scheme but resulted instead from the Company’s switch to a “back-end loaded”
16 sales model—a model that involved higher percentages of sales and inventory accumulation at
17 the end of fiscal quarters.

18 For similar reasons, Lead Plaintiffs also expected that Defendants would argue the alleged
19 misstatements were not made with “scienter” as required under the Exchange Act. Defendants
20 would likely have argued that the Individual Defendants did not have fraudulent intent to mislead
21 investors given that sales data on a unit basis did not meaningfully increase, and that, even if
22 their statements were false or misleading, that they believed those statements to be true based on
23 information available when the statements were made. Thus, there was a meaningful risk that
24 the Court or jury could find against Lead Plaintiffs on these issues on a complete record at
25 summary judgment or trial. Moreover, if Defendants succeeded in arguing that certain of the
26 misstatements were not actionable, the Class Period would have been shortened and this would
27 have resulted in a significant reduction in recoverable damages. For example, as noted above, if

1 Defendants persuaded the Court that their alleged misrepresentations prior to May 8, 2019 were
2 not actionable, the class could recover no more than \$112.9 million in damages (which would
3 make the settlement worth 26% of revised damages). ¶ 64.

4 In addition, Lead Plaintiffs also expected that Defendants would raise challenges to loss
5 causation, arguing that the price declines at issue were caused by the disclosure of information
6 unrelated to the alleged fraud. For example, Defendants were expected to argue that the price
7 declines following the alleged corrective disclosure on June 18, 2019 resulted from the
8 Company’s disclosure of tariffs impacting its sales in China, rather than disclosure of harms
9 resulting from the alleged channel stuffing scheme. Lead Plaintiffs also expected that Defendants
10 would challenge loss causation for the two remaining alleged corrective disclosures on August
11 6, 2019, and November 5, 2019, on the basis that information they disclosed was not sufficiently
12 related to the alleged misstatements. If Defendants had succeeded on these arguments, the
13 recoverable damages might have been less than the amount provided in the Settlement. ¶ 64.

14 All of these substantial litigation risks further support the fee requested.

15 **C. The skill required and the quality of the work performed support the fee**
16 **request.**

17 Courts have recognized that the “prosecution and management of a complex national class
18 action requires unique legal skills and abilities.” *Destafano v. Zynga, Inc.*, 2016 WL 537946, at
19 *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016); *see also Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1048. “This is particularly true in
20 securities cases because the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act makes it much more difficult
21 for securities plaintiffs to get past a motion to dismiss.” *Zynga*, 2016 WL 537946, at *17 (quoting
22 *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047). In considering this factor, courts also consider the quality
23 and vigor of opposing counsel. *See, e.g., In re Heritage Bond Litig.*, 2005 WL 1594403, at *20
24 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“the quality of opposing counsel is important in evaluating the quality
25 of Plaintiff’s counsel’s work”); *In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig.*, 438 F. Supp. 1303,
26 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (“plaintiffs’ attorneys in this class action have been up against established
27 and skillful defense lawyers, and should be compensated accordingly”).

1 Lead Counsel are among the most experienced and skilled practitioners in the securities-
2 litigation field, and the firms have a long and successful track record in securities cases throughout
3 the country, including within this Circuit. ¶¶ 82-83. Industry sources consistently rank Lead
4 Counsel BLB&G as one of the top plaintiffs’ firms in the country, and BLB&G has served as lead
5 or co-lead counsel in more “Top 100 U.S. Class Action Settlements of All Time” than any other
6 law firm in history. *Id.* at ¶ 82. BLB&G’s successes in this Circuit and elsewhere include, among
7 others, *In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Securities Litigation*, No. 99-cv-20743 (N.D. Cal.), in which
8 BLB&G recovered \$1.05 billion for investors, the largest recovery in a securities class action in
9 the Ninth Circuit; *Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, No. 16-cv-5479 (N.D. Cal.), in which BLB&G
10 recovered \$480 million for investors; *In re Allergan, Inc. Proxy Violation Securities Litigation*,
11 No. 14-cv-2004 (C.D. Cal.), in which BLB&G recovered \$250 million for investors; and *In re*
12 *Wells Fargo & Co. Securities Litigation*, 1:20-CV-04494 (GHW) (S.D.N.Y.), in which BLB&G
13 recovered \$1 billion for investors.

14 Similarly, trial courts in this District and throughout the Ninth Circuit have repeatedly
15 recognized Hagens Berman’s ability to serve as class counsel in securities class actions similar to
16 the instant litigation. ¶ 83. For example, Hagens Berman served as Lead Counsel and Class
17 Counsel in *Roberts v. Zuora, Inc.*, No. 3:19-cv-03422-SI (N.D. Cal.) (Illston, J.), where on behalf
18 of the certified class, Hagens Berman secured a \$75.5 million settlement that was recently finally
19 approved by the Court (ECF No. 277), representing a recovery of five times greater than the
20 median recovery obtained in comparable securities class actions cases in 2023. *Id.* at ECF No.
21 270 at p. 8. Similarly, in *In Re: Charles Schwab Corp.*, No. 08-CV-01510, ECF No. 1101 (N.D.
22 Cal.) (Alsup, J.), after Hagens Berman secured settlements totaling \$235 million recovering 45
23 percent and 85 percent of investor losses for the two different classes, the Honorable William
24 Alsup commented, “Class counsel did a good job persistently advocating for the best interests of
25 the class members, and obtained a very good result for the class” ECF No. 1101 at p. 12.
26 Further, in the *Aequitas Investor Litigation*, Case No. 3:16-cv-00580-AC (D. Or.) (Hernandez, J.),
27

1 Hagens Berman, on behalf of its clients, reached a unified \$234 million settlement with defendants,
2 allowing investors to recover 80% to 90% of their losses after the liquidation of the Aequitas estate.

3 Lead Counsel’s experience in complex securities cases facilitated Lead Counsel’s ability
4 to negotiate the Settlement, ultimately resulting in the \$29.5 million recovery. Lead Counsel
5 achieved this recovery by litigating against highly skilled and well-respected lawyers from Wilmer
6 Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP (“WilmerHale”) who vigorously advocated for their clients.

7 Lead Counsel’s efforts over the past five years of litigation included: (1) an extensive
8 investigation of the claims at issue; (2) research and preparation of the detailed Amended
9 Complaint and the revised Second Amended Complaint; (3) opposing Defendants’ motions to
10 dismiss the Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint through detailed briefing;
11 (4) drafting a motion for class certification, including assisting in the preparation of a related expert
12 report; (5) conducting substantial discovery, which included preparing and exchanging initial
13 disclosures and document requests, serving subpoenas on multiple third-parties, obtaining and
14 reviewing Defendants’ substantial production of hundreds-of-thousands of pages of documents,
15 and taking depositions; (6) succeeding on a motion to compel production of additional documents
16 from Defendants and third parties; (7) working with experts in loss causation and damages; and
17 (8) engaging in extended settlement negotiations, including preparing detailed mediation
18 statements and participating in two full-day mediation sessions. ¶¶ 5, 12-52.

19 **D. The contingent nature of the fee supports the fee request.**

20 “It is an established practice in the private legal market to reward attorneys for taking the
21 risk of non-payment by paying them a premium over their normal hourly rates for winning
22 contingency cases.” *WPPSS*, 19 F.3d at 1299; *see also Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co.*, 306
23 F.R.D. 245, 261 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“when counsel takes cases on a contingency fee basis, and
24 litigation is protracted, the risk of non-payment after years of litigation justifies a significant fee
25 award”). The Supreme Court has emphasized that private securities actions, like this one, “provide
26 ‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a necessary
27

1 supplement to [SEC] action.” *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 318-19
2 (2007).

3 As courts recognize, there have been many class actions in which plaintiffs’ counsel took
4 on the risk of pursuing claims on a contingency basis, expending thousands of hours and millions
5 of dollars, yet received no remuneration whatsoever despite their diligence and expertise. *See,*
6 *e.g., In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 597 F.3d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming grant of
7 summary judgment in favor of defendant on loss-causation grounds after years of litigation); *In re*
8 *Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 2009 WL 1709050, at *34 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2009) (granting summary
9 judgment to defendants after eight years of litigation), *aff’d*, 627 F.3d 376 (9th Cir. 2010).

10 Even plaintiffs who get past summary judgment and succeed at trial may find a judgment
11 in their favor overturned on appeal or on a post-trial motion. *See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props.,*
12 *Inc.*, 116 F.3d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 1997) (reversing jury verdict of \$81 million for plaintiffs); *In*
13 *re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2011 WL 1585605, at *38 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011)
14 (granting defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law following plaintiffs’ verdict), *aff’d*,
15 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012).

16 Here, Lead Counsel have committed significant resources, time, and money to prosecute
17 this Action vigorously and successfully for the Settlement Class’s benefit for five years—without
18 any payment or any guarantee of compensation. Lead Counsel’s fee award and expense
19 reimbursement in this Action has always been at risk in the case and contingent on this Court’s
20 discretion in awarding fees and expenses. If Lead Counsel had been unsuccessful at the motion to
21 dismiss stage, or lost at summary judgment or at trial, Lead Counsel would have received nothing
22 for their years of diligent prosecution of the claims for the benefit of the Settlement Class. This
23 significant contingency-fee risk further supports the requested fee.

24 **E. The reaction of the Settlement Class to date and the approval of Lead Plaintiffs**
25 **support the fee request.**

26 The reaction of the Settlement Class to the proposed Settlement and the fee motion also
27 supports approval of the fee request. *See Heritage Bond*, 2005 WL 1594403, at *21 (“The

1 existence or absence of objectors to the requested attorneys’ fee is a factor i[n] determining the
2 appropriate fee award.”). A total of 21,659 copies of the Notice and Claim Form have been sent
3 to potential Settlement Class Members and their nominees, and the Court-approved Summary
4 Notice was published in *The Wall Street Journal* and transmitted over the *PR Newswire* on March
5 11, 2025. *See* Segura Decl. (Ex. 4) at ¶¶ 11-12. The Notice informed potential Settlement Class
6 Members that Lead Counsel would apply for an award of attorneys’ fees in an amount not to
7 exceed 22% of the Settlement Fund. *See* Notice (Segura Decl. Ex. A) at ¶¶ 5, 57. The Notice
8 further informed Settlement Class Members of their right to object to the request for attorneys’
9 fees and expenses. *See id.* at p. 3 and ¶¶ 65-66. Although the deadline for filing any objections
10 will not run until June 25, 2025, to date, no Settlement Class Member has filed an objection to the
11 fees and expenses requested. Joint Fee Decl. ¶¶ 66, 72.

12 In addition, Lead Plaintiffs, which took an active role in the litigation and closely
13 supervised the work of Lead Counsel, both support the approval of the requested fee based on the
14 result obtained, the efforts of Lead Counsel, and the risks in the Action. *See* Menzel Decl. (Ex. 1)
15 at ¶¶ 5, 7; Trubnikov Decl. (Ex. 2) at ¶¶ 4-5, 7. Lead Plaintiffs’ endorsement of the fee request
16 further supports its approval. *See, e.g., In re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig.*, 327 F. Supp. 2d 426,
17 442 (D.N.J. 2004) (“Significantly, the Lead Plaintiffs, both of whom are institutional investors
18 with great financial stakes in the outcome of the litigation, have reviewed and approved Lead
19 Counsel’s fees and expenses request.”).

20 **F. The lodestar cross-check supports the fee request.**

21 “Although an analysis of the lodestar is not required for an award of attorneys’ fees in the
22 Ninth Circuit, a cross-check of the fee request with a lodestar amount can demonstrate the fee
23 request’s reasonableness.” *In re Amgen Inc. Secs. Litig.*, 2016 WL 10571773, at *9 (C.D. Cal.
24 Oct. 25, 2016); *see also In re Extreme Networks, Inc. Secs. Litig.*, 2019 WL 3290770, at *10 (N.D.
25 Cal. July 22, 2019) (noting that the “lodestar may provide a useful perspective on the
26 reasonableness of a given percentage award”). When the lodestar is used as a cross-check, the
27 “focus is not on the ‘necessity and reasonableness of every hour’ of the lodestar, but on the broader

1 question of whether the fee award appropriately reflects the degree of time and effort expended by
2 the attorneys.” *In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd. Multi-Dist. Litig.*, 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 270 (D.N.H. 2007);
3 *see In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S’holder Litig.*, 2014 WL 10212865, at *23 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014)
4 (“In contrast to the use of the lodestar method as a primary tool for setting a fee award, the lodestar
5 cross-check can be performed with a less exhaustive cataloging and review of counsel’s hours.”);
6 *Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 331 F. App’x 452, 456-57 (9th Cir. 2009).

7 Fee awards in class actions with contingency risks, such as this one, routinely represent
8 positive multipliers of counsel’s lodestar to account for the possibility of non-payment. *See Rihn*
9 *v. Acadia Pharm. Inc.*, 2018 WL 513448, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018) (“Courts have ‘routinely
10 enhanced the lodestar to reflect the risk of non-payment in common fund cases’” because, in doing
11 so, it provides a “financial incentive to accept contingent-fee cases which may produce
12 nothing.”). Courts award lodestar multipliers up to four times the counsel’s lodestar, and
13 sometimes even more. *See Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051-52 & n.6 (affirming 28% fee award
14 representing 3.65 multiplier and finding that “courts have routinely enhanced the lodestar to reflect
15 the risk of non-payment in common fund cases,” and that, when the lodestar is used as a cross-
16 check, “most” multipliers were in the range of 1 to 4, but citing examples of higher multipliers);
17 *see also Impax*, 2022 WL 2789496, at *9 (awarding 30% of \$33 million settlement representing a
18 2.6 multiplier); *Vataj*, 2021 WL 5161927, at *9 (approving 2.5 multiplier); *In re Capacitors*
19 *Antitrust Litig.*, 2018 WL 4790575, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2018) (“a lodestar multiplier of
20 around 4 times has frequently been awarded in common fund cases”); *Hopkins v. Stryker Sales*
21 *Corp.*, 2013 WL 496358, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013) (“Multipliers of 1 to 4 are commonly
22 found to be appropriate in complex class action cases.”).

23 As detailed in the Joint Fee Declaration, Lead Counsel spent over 20,500 hours of attorney
24 and other professional time prosecuting the Action for the benefit of the Settlement Class through
25 July 19, 2024, the date that Lead Plaintiffs filed their motion for preliminary approval of the
26 Settlement. ¶ 79. Lead Counsel’s lodestar, derived by multiplying the hours spent on the litigation
27 by each attorney or other professional by their 2024 hourly rates, is \$11,785,325. *Id.* It is well

1 established that it is appropriate to calculate counsel’s lodestar based on current, rather than
2 historical rates, as a method of compensating for the delay in payment and the loss of interest on
3 the funds. *See Missouri v. Jenkins*, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989); *WPPSS*, 19 F.3d at 1305; *In re*
4 *Apollo Inc. Secs. Litig.*, 2012 WL 1378677, at *7 n.2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2012).

5 The requested fee of 22% of the Settlement Fund equates to \$6,490,000 (plus interest) and,
6 therefore, represents a multiplier of 0.55 on Lead Counsel’s lodestar. ¶ 79. In other words, the
7 requested fee represents only 55% of the lodestar value of the time that Lead Counsel dedicated to
8 the Action. This “negative” or fractional multiplier is well below the range of multipliers—often
9 between one and four—commonly awarded in comparable litigation.

10 Indeed, Courts repeatedly recognize that a percentage fee request that is less than counsel’s
11 lodestar provides strong confirmation of the reasonableness of the award. *See, e.g., Davis v. Yelp,*
12 *Inc.*, 2023 WL 3063823, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2023) (“[A] multiplier of less than one suggests
13 that the negotiated fee award is reasonable.”); *Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.*, 2021 WL
14 5632673, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2021) (where 33% fee requested resulted in a fractional
15 multiplier of 0.528, the court found that the “lodestar cross-check [] provides a strong indication
16 of the reasonableness of Lead Counsel’s requested percentage award”); *Amgen*, 2016 WL
17 10571773, at *9 (“[C]ourts have recognized that a percentage fee that falls below counsel’s
18 lodestar strongly supports the reasonableness of the award.”); *In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec.*
19 *Litig.*, 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding “no real danger of overcompensation”
20 given that the requested fee represented a discount to counsel’s lodestar).

21 Consistent with the Northern District of California Procedural Guidance for Class Action
22 Settlements, the Joint Fee Declaration includes a breakdown of the hours that each attorney and
23 other professional devoted to the litigation into 14 distinct projects undertaken over the course of
24 the litigation. *See* ¶¶ 78, 80. In addition, for each attorney whose time is included in Lead
25 Counsel’s lodestar, a summary of the principal tasks that he or she worked on in the litigation has
26 been provided. *See* Ex. 5A-2, 5B-2. Moreover, Lead Counsel have not included in the fee
27 application *any* time expended preparing the motion for fees and expenses. ¶ 78. Lead Counsel

1 also made other reductions to its time in the interest of billing judgment, including, for example,
2 removing timekeepers with fewer than 10 hours dedicated to the Action.

3 The hourly rates used to calculate Lead Counsel’s lodestar are also reasonable. The hourly
4 rates for Lead Counsel range from \$800 to \$1,350 for partners, from \$700 to \$875 for senior
5 counsel or “of counsel”; \$350 to \$700 for associates, and from \$300 to \$425 for paralegals and
6 case managers. *See* Exs. 5A-1, 5B-1. The blended hourly rate for all timekeepers in the application
7 is \$572. Lead Counsel believe these rates are within the range of reasonable fees for attorneys
8 working on sophisticated class action litigation in this District. *See, e.g., Impax*, 2022 WL
9 2789496, at *9 (finding that hourly rates for class counsel which ranged “from \$760 to \$1,325 for
10 partners, \$895 to \$1,150 for senior counsel, and \$175 to \$520 for associates” were in line with
11 “prevailing rates in this district for personnel of comparable experience, skill, and reputation”);
12 *Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 2018 WL 6619983, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018) (approving
13 Lead Counsel BLB&G’s then-applicable 2018 rates, ranging from \$650 to \$1,250 for partners or
14 senior counsel, \$400 to \$650 for associates, and \$245 to \$350 for paralegals, as reasonable for
15 purposes of lodestar cross-check), *aff’d sub nom. Hefler v. Pekoc*, 802 F. App’x 285 (9th Cir.
16 2020); *In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 2017 WL
17 1047834, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) (approving fee award following lodestar cross-check in
18 2017 where blended average hourly rate was \$529 per hour, with hourly rates ranging up to \$1,600
19 for partners and up to \$790 for associates).

20 Lead Counsel’s staff attorneys are or were full-time employees of the firms and were
21 integrally involved in the prosecution of this case. *See* Ex. 5A at ¶ 7; Ex. 5B at ¶ 7. These attorneys
22 are highly experienced, as set forth in their attorney biographies. *See* Ex. 5A-3, at pp. 11-12; Ex.
23 5B-3, at pp. 29-30. Their hourly rates ranged from \$410 to \$575 per hour, which is reasonable
24 based on the market rates for staff attorneys working in similar contexts.² *See, e.g., In re Diamond*

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² Hagens Berman also employed a small number of contract attorneys with hourly rates of \$400
per hour, as needed to complete document review in order to prepare for depositions. *See* Ex. 5B
at 7; Ex. 5B-1; Ex 5B-3, at pp. 31-33.

1 *Sports Net LLC*, Case No. 23-90126 (CML), Seventh Interim and Final Fee Application of
2 WilmerHale, at 18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2025), ECF No. 53 (Ex. 7C) (staff attorneys at
3 WilmerHale in bankruptcy matter in 2024 had \$695 hourly rate); *In re Endo Int’l plc*, Case No.
4 22-22549 (JLG), Fifth Interim & Final Fee Application of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
5 LLP (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2024), ECF No. 4312 (Ex. 7D) (staff attorneys at Skadden Arps
6 in bankruptcy matter in 2024 had rates ranging from \$630 to \$657); *see also In re Twitter Inc. Sec.*
7 *Litig.*, 2022 WL 17248115, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2022) (approving fee award in securities
8 class action that included Iodestar crosscheck that included Staff Attorneys’ 2021 rates ranging
9 from \$335 to \$425 per hour with a blended rate of \$388 per hour).

10 The reasonableness of Lead Counsel’s rates is further underscored here by the significantly
11 higher rates charged by defense counsel in this case. *See In re Hi-Crush Partners L.P. Sec. Litig.*,
12 2014 WL 7323417, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014) (approving as reasonable hourly rates in
13 securities action that were “comparable to . . . defense-side law firms litigating matters of similar
14 magnitude”). Several recent filings by WilmerHale, counsel for Defendants here, indicate that its
15 hourly rates for 2023 and 2024 ranged from \$1,161 to \$1,920 for partners; from \$1,057 to \$1,335
16 for of counsel and special counsel; from \$612 to \$1,120 for associates; and from \$517 to \$710 for
17 paralegals. *See In re Diamond Sports Net LLC*, Case No. 23-90126 (CML), Seventh Interim and
18 Final Fee Application of WilmerHale, at 18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2025), ECF No. 53 (Ex.
19 7C) (“During the Final Fee Period [October 1, 2024 to November 13, 2024], WilmerHale’s hourly
20 billing rates for attorneys ranged from \$1,205 to \$1,920 for partners, \$1,125 to \$1,310 for counsel,
21 \$680 to \$1,115 for associates, \$695 for staff attorneys, and \$195 to \$660 for paraprofessionals.”);
22 *In re Infinity Pharms., Inc.*, Case No. 23-11640 (BLS), Fourth Monthly and Final Fee Application
23 of WilmerHale (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 10, 2024), ECF No. 284 (Ex. 7E) (reporting blended hourly
24 rate of \$1,049.37); *In re Zymergen Inc.*, Case No. 23-11661 (KBO), Third Monthly & Final Fee
25 Application of WilmerHale (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 22, 2024), ECF No. 436 (Ex. 7F) (blended hourly
26 rate of \$906.18).

1 These rates are substantially higher—at all levels—than the rates used by Lead Counsel to
2 calculate their lodestar.

3 **III. Lead Counsel’s expenses are reasonable and should be approved.**

4 “Attorneys who create a common fund are entitled to the reimbursement of expenses they
5 advanced for the benefit of the class.” *Vincent v. Reser*, 2013 WL 621865, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
6 19, 2013). In assessing whether counsel’s expenses are compensable in a common fund case,
7 courts look to whether the costs are of the type typically billed by attorneys to paying clients in the
8 marketplace. *See Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (“Attorneys may recover their reasonable
9 expenses that would typically be billed to paying clients in non-contingency matters.”).

10 The expenses sought here are of the type that are charged to hourly paying clients and were
11 required to prosecute the litigation. These expense items were incurred separately by Lead
12 Counsel and are not duplicated in the firms’ hourly rates. From the beginning of the case, Lead
13 Counsel were aware that they might not recover any of their expenses and would not recover
14 anything unless and until the Action was successfully resolved. Lead Counsel also understood
15 that, even assuming that the case was ultimately successful, an award of expenses would not
16 compensate it for the lost use of the funds advanced to prosecute this Action. Thus, Lead Counsel
17 were motivated to, and did, take significant steps to minimize expenses whenever practicable
18 without jeopardizing the vigorous and efficient prosecution of the Action. ¶ 91.

19 As discussed in detail in the Joint Fee Declaration, Lead Counsel incurred a total of
20 \$593,198.12 in litigation expenses in litigating the Action over the past five years. ¶¶ 90-97. The
21 expenses for which payment is sought were reasonable and necessary for the prosecution and
22 resolution of the litigation and are of the types that are routinely charged to clients in non-
23 contingent litigation. These include expert fees, document-management costs, online research,
24 court fees, and telephone and postage expenses. ¶¶ 93-97.

25 Of the total expenses, Lead Counsel incurred \$191,578.31, or approximately 32% of the
26 total litigation expenses, on Lead Plaintiffs’ experts and consultants, including Plaintiffs’ expert
27 in the areas of financial economics (including damages, loss causation, and market efficiency), as

1 well as several other expert consultants. ¶ 93. The combined costs for online legal and factual
2 research amounted to \$108,378.67, or approximately 18% of the total expenses. ¶ 94. Lead
3 Counsel also incurred \$53,575 for Lead Plaintiffs' share of the mediation costs charged for the
4 services of the experienced mediators from Philips ADR Enterprises. ¶ 96.

5 In addition, Lead Counsel incurred \$138,112.32 in attorneys' fees for the retention of
6 independent counsel, Hach Rose Schirripa & Cheverie LLP, to represent several former
7 Plantronics or Polycom employees that Lead Counsel contacted during its investigation and who
8 wished to be represented by independent counsel. ¶ 95. These costs were substantial because
9 Defendants deposed four of these former employees concerning the statements they made that
10 were included in the Complaint. *Id.* Similar expenses for payment of fees for independent witness
11 counsel have been approved by courts. *See, e.g., In re Qualcomm Inc. Sec. Litig.*, Case No. 3:17-
12 cv-00121-JO-MSB, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2024), ECF No. 450 (awarding expenses to
13 class counsel that included reimbursement for the costs of paying for independent counsel for
14 third-party witnesses); *SEB Inv. Mgmt. AB v. Symantec Corp.*, No. C 18-02902-WHA, slip op. at
15 15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2022), ECF No. 421 (same); *In re Willis Towers Watson PLC Proxy Litig.*,
16 No. 1:17-cv-1338-AJT-JFA, slip op. at 1-3 (E.D. Va. May 21, 2021), ECF No. 347 (same); *In re*
17 *Impinj, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. 3:18-cv-05704-RSL, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2020), ECF
18 No. 106 (same).

19 The other Litigation Expenses for which payment sought are all types of expenses that are
20 necessarily incurred in litigation and routinely charged to clients. These expenses included
21 document management costs, court fees, photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, and postage
22 and express mail. A complete breakdown by category of the expenses incurred by Lead Counsel
23 is set forth in Exhibit 6 to the Joint Fee Declaration. Courts routinely approve litigation expenses
24 such as these. *See, e.g., Vega v. Weatherford U.S., Ltd. P'ship*, 2016 WL 7116731, at *17 (E.D.
25 Cal. Dec. 7, 2016) ("legal research expenses, copying costs, mediation fees, postage, federal
26 express charges, expert fees, . . . and travel expenses," among others, were all categories of
27 expenses "routinely reimbursed" in class actions); *Zynga*, 2016 WL 537946, at *22 ("courts

1 throughout the Ninth Circuit regularly award litigation costs and expenses—including
2 photocopying, printing, postage, court costs, research on online databases, experts and consultants,
3 and reasonable travel expenses—in securities class actions, as attorneys routinely bill private
4 clients for such expenses in non-contingent litigation”).

5 The Notice provided to potential Settlement Class Members informed them that Lead
6 Counsel intended to apply for the payment of litigation expenses in an amount not to exceed
7 \$750,000. Notice ¶¶ 5, 57. The total amount of expenses sought, \$593,198.12, is less than the
8 amount stated in the Notice. The deadline for objecting to the fee and expense application is June
9 25, 2025. To date, there have been no objections to the request for attorneys’ fees or litigation
10 expenses.

11 **IV. Lead Counsel request that 100% of their expenses and 90% of the attorneys’ fees be**
12 **paid upon award.**

13 Consistent with this Court’s practices, Lead Counsel requests that 100% of the Litigation
14 Expenses and 90% of the attorneys’ fees awarded by the Court be paid upon approval of the
15 Settlement and entry of the order approving the fee and expense award, with the remaining 10%
16 of the attorneys’ fees to be paid upon entry of the Post-Distribution Accounting (following
17 distribution of the Net Settlement Fund to eligible claimants). *See Splunk*, Case No. 4:20-cv-
18 08600-JST, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2024), ECF No. 143 (Ex. 7A) (awarding 90%);
19 *Hessefort v. Super Micro Computer, Inc.*, 2023 WL 7185778, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2023)
20 (same); *Twitter*, w, at *1 (same).

21 Lead Counsel believe that that a 10% holdback of attorneys’ fees is most appropriate here
22 because it balances Lead Counsel’s interest and reasonable expectation in receiving prompt
23 payment after having prosecuted the Action for over five years without compensation, while
24 creating sufficient financial incentive to ensure that Lead Counsel remain actively involved in
25 overseeing the prompt distribution of settlement funds to eligible Claimants.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Lead Counsel respectfully request that the Court award attorneys’ fees of 22% of the Settlement Fund and payment of Litigation Expenses in the amount of \$593,198.12.

Dated: April 25, 2025

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
OAKLAND DIVISION

IN RE PLANTRONICS, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION

No. 4:19-cv-07481-JST

**[PROPOSED] ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES**

Judge: Hon. Jon S. Tigar
Courtroom: 6

1 WHEREAS, this matter came on for hearing on August 14, 2025 (the “Settlement
2 Hearing”) on Lead Counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and payment of Litigation
3 Expenses. The Court having considered all matters submitted to it at the Settlement Hearing and
4 otherwise; and it appearing that notice of the Settlement Hearing substantially in the form approved
5 by the Court was mailed to all Settlement Class Members who or which could be identified with
6 reasonable effort, and that a summary notice of the hearing substantially in the form approved by
7 the Court was published in *The Wall Street Journal* and was transmitted over the *PR Newswire*
8 pursuant to the specifications of the Court; and the Court having considered and determined the
9 fairness and reasonableness of the award of attorneys’ fees and Litigation Expenses requested,

10 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

11 1. This Order incorporates by reference the definitions in the Stipulation and
12 Agreement of Settlement dated July 18, 2024 (ECF No. 230-1) (the “Stipulation”) and all terms
13 not otherwise defined herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Stipulation.

14 2. The Court has jurisdiction to enter this Order and over the subject matter of the
15 Action and all parties to the Action, including all Settlement Class Members.

16 3. Notice of Lead Counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and payment of
17 Litigation Expenses was given to all Settlement Class Members who could be identified with
18 reasonable effort. The form and method of notifying the Settlement Class of the motion for an
19 award of attorneys’ fees and expenses satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
20 of Civil Procedure, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7)),
21 due process, and all other applicable law and rules, constituted the best notice practicable under
22 the circumstances, and constituted due and sufficient notice to all persons and entities entitled
23 thereto.

24 4. In carefully considering Lead Counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and
25 payment of Litigation Expenses, the Court has considered the reasonableness of the request in light
26 of percentage of the common fund awards in similar cases and additional factors including (1) the
27 results achieved, (2) the risks of litigation, (3) the skill required and the quality of work, (4) the
28 contingent nature of the fee and the financial burden carried by the Lead Plaintiffs, (5) awards

1 made in similar cases, (6) the class's reaction, and (7) a lodestar cross-check. *See Vizcaino v.*
2 *Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2002).

3 5. Lead Counsel are hereby awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of 22% of the
4 Settlement Fund, or \$6,490,000 (plus interest earned on this amount at the same rate as the
5 Settlement Fund). Lead Counsel are also hereby awarded \$593,198.12 for payment of their
6 litigation expenses. These attorneys' fees and expenses shall be paid from the Settlement Fund
7 and the Court finds these sums to be fair and reasonable.

8 6. Lead Counsel shall be paid 90% of the attorneys' fees awarded and 100% of the
9 approved expenses immediately upon entry of the Judgment approving the Settlement and this
10 Order. The remaining 10% of the attorneys' fees awarded (and any interest earned thereon) will
11 be paid after Lead Plaintiffs conduct the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund to eligible
12 claimants and file a Post-Distribution Accounting.

13 7. In making this award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses to be paid
14 from the Settlement Fund, the Court has considered and found that:

15 a. The Settlement has created a fund of \$29,500,000 in cash that has been
16 funded into escrow pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation, and that numerous Settlement
17 Class Members who submit acceptable Claim Forms will benefit from the Settlement that
18 occurred because of the efforts of Lead Counsel, and the Settlement amount is fair and
19 reasonable;

20 b. Lead Counsel litigated this case on a purely contingent basis, and have not
21 received any compensation for their work on this matter over the last five years;

22 c. The fee sought is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's benchmark amount in
23 percentage fee cases, *see In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th
24 Cir. 2015);

25 d. The requested fee has been reviewed and approved as reasonable by Lead
26 Plaintiffs, two sophisticated investors that actively supervised the Action;

1 e. Copies of the Notice were mailed to over 21,000 potential Settlement Class
2 Members and nominees stating that Lead Counsel would apply for attorneys' fees for Lead
3 Counsel in an amount not to exceed 22% of the Settlement Fund and payment of Litigation
4 Expenses in an amount not to exceed \$750,000 and [no] objections to the requested award
5 of attorneys' fees or Litigation Expenses were submitted;

6 f. Lead Counsel, which have substantial experience in handling securities
7 class actions and the types of claims asserted herein, conducted the litigation and achieved
8 the Settlement with skill, perseverance and diligent advocacy;

9 g. Had Lead Counsel not achieved the Settlement there would remain a
10 significant risk that Lead Plaintiffs and the other members of the Settlement Class may
11 have recovered less or nothing from Defendants;

12 h. Lead Counsel devoted over 20,500 hours, with a lodestar value of
13 approximately \$11.785 million through July 19, 2024, to achieve the Settlement, and will
14 continue to perform work on behalf of the Settlement Class in overseeing the Claims
15 Administrator's processing of claim received and the distribution of the Net Settlement
16 Fund; and

17 i. The amount of attorneys' fees awarded and expenses to be paid from the
18 Settlement Fund are fair and reasonable and consistent with awards in similar cases.

19 8. Any appeal or any challenge affecting this Court's approval regarding any
20 attorneys' fees and expense application shall in no way disturb or affect the finality of the
21 Judgment.

22 9. Exclusive jurisdiction is hereby retained over the parties and the Settlement Class
23 Members for all matters relating to this Action, including the administration, interpretation,
24 effectuation or enforcement of the Stipulation and this Order.

25 10. In the event that the Settlement is terminated or the Effective Date of the Settlement
26 otherwise fails to occur, this Order shall be rendered null and void to the extent provided by the
27 Stipulation.
28

